Presidential Stakes and the Minority Votes

Sri Lankas fifth presidential election is looming large on the political horizon. Political excitement is in the air. Cynics have observed that the difference between a democracy and a dictatorship is that in the former the people think that they are indeed electing their rulers freely. The Presidential poll being an Island wide direct election provides all voters regardless of race, religion, caste and creed an opportunity to elect the most powerful single individual for a specific term. In practical terms the minority communities of the Country have no real chance of directly electing one of their ilk to this post though any citizen can aspire to be President in theory. The development of what can be termed a two party system in Sri Lanka and the entrenched bloc votes of the Majority community according to party lines on the one hand and the mobilisation of minority community votes on the other has in the past created a situation where the latter groups are in a position to tilt the scales in any decision. This has given the minority communities an importance far beyond their numerical strength in the making and unmaking of executive presidents. Some parties representing minority communities have resisted changes to the presidential system on the basis that the minorities could lose their influence in a non - presidential system. Despite the dependency of several candidates on minority votes to win the presidency the harsh reality is that such a factor has not restrained overt anti - minority acts on the part of Presidents elected in such fashion. In spite of this disconnect between Presidential polls and presidential performances each election campaign sees replays of the old, old game of wooing minorities by the premier candidates. This election would be no exception to this general rule. Election dates are to be fixed. The final list of candidates is not complete. The names and parties of the chief candidates are known. It is a foregone conclusion that the choice is between Ranil Wickremasinghe of the UNP and Mahinda Rajapakse of the SLFP.If the Sinhala - Buddhist vote gets divided in near equal numbers the minority vote will determine the victor. Even if one candidate gets a lions share of the Sinhala - Buddhist votes the other may yet edge him out if he garners the bulk of the non - Buddhist minority votes. The poll will not be a single issue election. The rising cost of living will affect voters across ethnic lines. Nevertheless the single most emotive issue dominating the poll will be that of the ethnic conflict and how to manage or resolve that conflict. There has been convergence and divergence betwen President Kumaratunga and opposition leader Wickremasinghe on this in the past. Both are supportive of the peace process facilitated by Norway aiming to reach a negotiated settlement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Both agree that some interim arrangements of power sharing with tigers are necessary.The difference however is in the sequencing. Hitherto Kumaratunga had envisaged a course where any interim arrangement had to be linked to the final settlement. Wickremasinghe however was more pragmatic and was amenable to an interim arrangement being set up without making linkage to a final solution a conditionality. It was this difference of approach that came out clearly on the LTTE demand for an Interim Self - Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North - East. The UNP government of Wickremasinghe expressed reservations on some aspects of the demand but agreed to negotiate further on the matter.President Kumaratunga and her party criticised that approach, condemned the ISGA proposal and finally dismissed Wickremasinghes government on that count. If Wickremasinghe wins the presidency there is no doubt that he will pick up the threads of the peace process from the point where he was crudely interrupted and continue. Of course a snap Parliamentaey election will be on the cards to help procure a favourable majority. As far as Mahinda Rajapakse is concerned things are not clear on this . For one thing Kumaratunga herself modified her earlier stance when she found that no meaningful progress was possible. She tried in her own way to use the tsunami disaster as a means to reconcile in a limited manner with the LTTE and work together with the tigers in reconstruction and rehabilitation. This was rejected outright by her ex - ally the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna which opposed any form of engagement with the LTTE. The dilemma facing Rajapakse is whether he should follow the Kumaratunga mode or reject it. There is a general perception in the country that Wickremasinghe will in the final analysis get more minority votes than Rajapakse. If so simple arithmetic demands that Rajapakse focus on the Sinhala - Buddhist vote. For this some understanding and working arrangement with the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya "saffronistas" may be necessary. Mahinda may also have to dissociate himself with Kumaratungas dream project the P- TOMS. However deft his fancy footwork may be any perceived veering towards the majoritarian hawks by Rajapakse will naturally result in an inevitable minority backlash. The LTTE controlled Tamil media has effectively conditioned the Tamil psyche into JVP phobic. As for Champika Ranawaka and the yellow robed politicos all minorities in the country are firmly opposed. It was the Up Country Tamil votes that helped JR Jayewardene trailing below the 50% mark to zoom to victory with 54%. When Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman was congratulated for delivering the plantation vote he sumply smiled and said " I did not do anything.When the plantation worker saw that the opponent was Kobbekaduwe of land reform fame he or she instinctively voted against". Likewise the minority voters of the Island will no doubt vote overwhelmingly against Mahinda if he is perceived to be a JVP - JHU bedfellow. If he does not align with the JVP and JHU they may field separate candidates and eat into Mahindas Sinhala votes. On the other hand even if Mahinda wins by aligning with the JVP and JHU parties the irrational demands they may make of him will stultify any forward movement on the peace process and set the stage for war. One possibility is for the JVP and JHU to see Wickremasinghe as the greater evil and extend unconditional support for Rajapakse. Whichever way the wind blows the minority votes will no doubt play a crucial and decisive role. There is very little likelihood of a free and fair poll in the Tamil areas of the N - E. If the April 2 parliamentary poll of 2004 is any indicator the LTTE is capable of manipulating Northern votes. It remains to be seen whether the Karuna rebellion will change this scenario in the East.Apart from vote rigging most genuine Sri Lankan Tamil votes will no doubt be supportive of the best pro - peace candidate. The "christians" feeling alienated and insecure by the violence of the non - christian extremists will no doubt vote as a bloc this time. Their choice too will be for a comparatively liberal secular type of Buddhist candidate as opposed to the stridently "Buddhistic" one. The Muslim and Up Country Tamil votes will be fragmented. Both candidates will get their share of the votesBut Rajapakse identifying with the JVP and JHU can cause a massive minority swing away from him..In Colombo Wickremasinghe has the upper hand among minorities. To their credit both Wickremasinghe and Rajapakse are not seen as "anti - minority" Sinhala leaders. But an overt identification with the forces of Sinhala hegemonic - centrism and Buddhist supremacist - chauvinism can indict either of them in the eyes of the minorities who are capable of influencing the final verdict .